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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MICHAEL C. MARTIN, : Case No. 20110056-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
On August 28, 2009, the trial court entered judgment against Appellant Michael 
Martin for criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-106 
(2003) and 76-3-402(1) (Supp. 2006). On December 17, 2010, the trial court reinstated 
the time for filing an appeal, pursuant to Rule 4(f), Utah R. App. P. On January 7, 2011, 
Martin filed his Notice of Appeal. This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (Supp. 2010). The judgment and the order reinstating 
the appeal are attached at Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it ruled that Martin violated the 
conditions of the plea agreement. 
Standard of Review: This Court will review the issue for an abuse of discretion. 
See State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798? 804 (Utah 1990); State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 
1 
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991 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). A district court abuses its discretion when it fails to properly 
consider relevant factors and when it misapplies the law. See State v. McCovey, 803 
P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) ("An abuse of discretion results when the judge 'fails to 
consider all legally relevant factors'" (note omitted)); State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 
425 (Utah 1991) ("[T]rial courts do not have discretion to misapply the law"). 
Preservation: The issue was preserved in the record at 197:23, 56-59. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at 
Addendum B: Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-l to -4 (2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This matter began as a dispute between neighbors, and 
resulted in charges against Martin for two counts of criminal mischief. In November 
2004, the State filed an Information, charging count one as a second-degree felony and 
count two as a third-degree felony. R.3-5. The State alleged that Martin tore down a 
fence and cut a tree belonging to his neighbor, Kathryn Randazzo. Id. On December 22, 
2004, the trial court ordered Martin to have "no contact with" Ms. Randazzo. R.9. 
Course of the Proceedings: On September 29, 2005, the State and Martin 
entered into an agreement to resolve the criminal case, R.51-58, where the State agreed to 
dismiss count one (the second-degree felony), and Martin agreed to enter a no-contest 
plea on count two (the third-degree felony). R.51. Also, the trial court agreed to hold the 
plea on count two in abeyance for one year on the condition that "the defendant replace 
the chain link fence and replant an elm tree that defendant removed[,] and replace the 
7 
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shrubs destroyed and to have the work done by a licensed third party." R.55, 60; see also 
R.188:7, 10-13. 
On July 28, 2006, less than ten months after entry of the plea-in-abeyance 
agreement, the State filed papers for an order to show cause why Martin should not be 
found in violation of the agreement. R. 108-110. On January 19, 2007, the trial court 
held an evidentiary hearing and ruled that Martin was in violation. See R. 124-25. It 
"revoked" the plea in abeyance and set the matter for sentencing. Id. 
Disposition in the Court Below: On April 20, 2007, the court entered judgment 
against Martin for two counts of criminal mischief, and it sentenced him to probation for 
24 months. See R.131-33; 192:16-19. On May 8, 2007, the court issued a Memorandum 
Decision to clarify and correct the judgment. See R. 136-39. Pursuant to the 
Memorandum Decision, the trial court vacated count one - as the parties had intended 
under the original terms of the plea agreement - and it entered a conviction for a class A 
misdemeanor on count two. Id. In addition, the court set aside sentencing to assess 
restitution. R.138-39. 
On May 21, 2007, Martin initiated his first appeal by filing a notice. R.141. On 
February 20, 2009, this Court denied the appeal stating that due to the trial court's 
Memorandum Decision, there was no final order. Thus, the appeal was premature. See 
State v. Martin, 2009 UT App 43,1J15, 204 P.3d 875. This Court returned the case to the 
trial court, and on August 28, 2009, the court reinstated the judgment. See R.323-24. It 
ordered Martin to serve a term of 365 days in jail, it suspended the jail term, it ordered 
probation for 12 months, and it set the matter for a restitution hearing. Id. 
3 
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In November 2009 and February 2010, the court held restitution hearings and on 
April 9, 2010, it entered an order for $8,650. R.340-44. On June 24, 2010, Martin 
initiated an appeal for a second time. R.363. On August 26, 2010, this Court ruled that 
the appeal was untimely: "Martin was sentenced on his no-contest plea on August 28, 
2009, His notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days after entry of the sentence." 
State v. Martin TIR Case No. 20100536; 2010 UT App 238. Also, the court noted that 
Martin was not appealing the restitution order but attempting to "reach back to challenge 
his conviction." IdL n.l. The Court recommended that Martin seek relief under Rule 4(f), 
Utah R. App. P., if appropriate. Id n.2. 
In September 2010, Martin filed for relief under Rule 4(f), among other things. 
R.375-79. On December 17, 2010, the Court held an evidentiary hearing, R.448, and 
Martin testified that after he was sentenced on August 28, 2009, he contacted his trial 
attorney within the 30-day period to appeal from the sentence and judgment. R.448:13-
16. The attorney advised Martin to appeal after the trial court ruled on restitution. 
R.448:15. Consequently, Martin did not appeal from the August 28 sentence. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that counsel's advice was 
incorrect and it led to the failure to file a timely notice of appeal. Also on December 17, 
2010, the court reinstated the time for filing the appeal. R.448:23-24; 443. On January 7, 
2011, Martin filed a notice of appeal. It is timely. He is not incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As stated supra, this matter originally began as a dispute between neighbors. As a 
result of the dispute, the State filed an Information against Martin for two counts of 
4 
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criminal mischief. R.3-5. It alleged that he tore down a fence in Ms. Randazzo's 
backyard and cut down an elm tree. Id. Several months after the State filed the charges, 
the parties entered into a plea agreement. R.51-58. The State agreed to dismiss count 
one of the Information, and Martin agreed to enter a no-contest plea on count two. Id. 
Also, the trial court agreed to hold the plea on count two in abeyance for one year on the 
condition that "the defendant replace the chain link fence and replant an elm tree that 
defendant removed[,] and replace the shrubs destroyed and to have the work done by a 
licensed third party." R.55; see_alsoR. 188:7, 10-13. 
On July 28, 2006, the State filed papers for an order to show cause why Martin 
should not be found in violation of the plea-in-abeyance agreement. R. 108-110. 
According to the papers, Martin violated the plea agreement by "entering the [neighbor's] 
property and replacing the fence himself." R.109, ^|2. Also, the State alleged that Martin 
failed to have a damaged tree stump removed from the property prior to restoring 
landscape. Id., ^3. It claimed that Martin failed to have the work "completed by a 
licensed, third party professional." IcL And it claimed that Martin failed to "replace the 
foliage that was taken commensurate in value to the one destroyed." Id., ^4. According 
to the papers, the original tree that was damaged "was a well established tree valued at 
the time around $4,000.00. The defendant replaced the tree with a sapling valued at 
approximately $25.00." Id, 
On January 19, 2007, the court held an evidentiary hearing where Ms. Randazzo 
discussed the fence, the tree and the foliage in her yard. R. 197:5-6. She acknowledged 
that the fence had been replaced. R. 197:10. However, she claimed the posts were 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
uneven, the gate did not close properly, the fence bowed in the middle, and it was not on 
her property line. R.197:10, 17-19, 24; but see R. 197:26. In addition, according to Ms. 
Randazzo, she had not been contacted by a third-party licensed contractor to do any of 
the replacement work. R.197:7, 10. 
Ms. Randazzo acknowledged she had received a replacement tree. However, she 
complained that the old tree stump had not been removed, and the original elm had not 
been replaced with a mature tree of commensurate value. R. 197:7-9, 26. Instead, she 
received a sapling valued at $29.97. R. 197:8-9. Also, Ms. Randazzo acknowledged 
foliage and vines now, R. 197:27, where vines originally were destroyed. R. 197:19-20. 
After Ms. Randazzo testified, the prosecutor called additional witnesses. He 
called Stacey Poppleton, Ms. Randazzo's neighbor, to testify that she had seen Martin 
"fiddling" with an end cap or finial on a corner post of the fence in the fall or winter of 
the previous year. R. 197:32-33, 36. Also, the prosecutor presented evidence from 
Joseph Johnson concerning the value of destroyed foliage. R. 197:40. 
Martin then testified. He discussed the chain-link fence and foliage. He replaced 
the fence and reinforced it with help from a third-party licensed electrician "slash 
handyman," Evan Lee. R. 197:47, 48. Martin acknowledged that Lee and he did the 
work together, he assisted when needed, and he was able to assist without trespassing on 
Ms. Randazzo's property. R.197:49-50, 52-53. Martin explained the need for a licensed 
electrician in installing a chain-linked fence. R.197:50, 52. Also, he acknowledged that 
Lee was not present at all times throughout installation of the fence, but Lee did most of 
the work and he was there "[t]he majority of the time." R.197:50, 55. 
6 
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With respect to the foliage, Martin identified vines on the property. See R. 197:45-
46; Defendant's Exhibits 2 & 3. And he testified that he purchased a tree as a 
replacement for the elm, but did not know what to do with it. R. 197:53-54. He contacted 
his attorney for advice and tried to communicate with the assistant district attorney but 
received no information. Id. Martin testified that the tree was still available. R. 197:54. 
After Martin testified, the trial court ruled as follows: 
I think [Mr. Martin has] frankly acknowledged, at least in my mind, the work was 
not done as ordered by a third-party. 
At least what I've heard - and I'll let you address it if you want. One, I don't hear 
anything to suggest he's violated the no contact order. Two, the shrubbery, no real 
basis for finding that. Three, the tree, frankly, the order is ambiguous. If it wasn't 
ambiguous, you wouldn't be offering that sapling as a replacement, that's -
certainly doesn't violate the letter; you've absolutely violated the spirit of the 
agreement. And last, though, is the third-party agreement, that it be done by a 
licensed third party. You know, one of the reasons was - that is, so we wouldn't 
have this exact kind of issue. The fact is, color it however you want, he was out 
there with a third-party doing the work, and not supervised by the third-party at all 
times. 
R. 197:55-56; see also id. at 197:57 (stating the order required that "all work be[] done by 
a third-party, and you tell me he's just assisting, and somebody is looking over his 
shoulder. It's not being done by him. And, frankly, he's admitting that he wasn't super-
vised at all times by the third-party"); ki at 197:59 ("My ruling as to the plea in abeyance 
goes solely to not having all work done by a licensed third-party, period"). The court 
then set the matter for sentencing. See R. 197:66. Martin's appeal challenges the trial 
court's ruling as it relates to the alleged violations of the plea-in-abeyance agreement. 
7 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Martin and the State entered into an agreement, whereby Martin agreed to replace 
a fence and foliage in his neighbor's yard, and he agreed to have the work done by a 
licensed third party. Sometime after entering into the agreement, the State filed an order 
to show cause, alleging that Martin was in violation of the agreement. Thereafter, the 
trial court held a hearing on the matter. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Martin violated the 
agreement because he assisted the third party in replacing the fence, and he was not 
supervised by the third party at all times in doing the work. Martin does not dispute the 
trial court's findings. Rather, he maintains that the plea-in-abeyance agreement did not 
prohibit him from assisting with the work and it did not require that all work be done 
totally, exclusively, and solely by the third party. 
In addition, to the extent the trial court intended the plea agreement to be so 
restrictive, it was required to ensure that when the parties entered into the agreement, it 
contained such terms explicitly and unambiguously. Since the agreement failed to set out 
those terms, the trial court could not later apply them against Martin for a violation. 
Moreover, Martin was in substantial compliance with the terms and conditions of the 
agreement. 
Based on the record here, the trial court erred in ruling that Martin was in violation 
of the agreement, and its error constituted an abuse of discretion. Martin respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court ruling and reinstate the agreement. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND MARTIN TO BE IN VIOLATION OF 
TERMS THAT WERE NOT EXPLICITLY SET FORTH IN THE PLEA 
AGREEMENT. THAT WAS ERROR. 
A. AN AGREEMENT FOR A PLEA-IN-ABEYANCE MUST CONTAIN 
EXPLICIT CONDITIONS. 
(1) Utah Law Requires the Agreement to Include a Full Detailed Recitation of the 
Terms, Title 77, Chapter 2a governs plea-in-abeyance agreements. It states the 
following: 
(a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the prosecution and the 
defendant and approved by the court shall include a full, detailed recitation of the 
requirements and conditions agreed to by the defendant and the reason for 
requesting the court to hold the plea in abeyance. 
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any combination of misdemeanors and felonies, the 
agreement shall be in writing and shall, prior to acceptance by the court, be 
executed by the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's counsel in 
the presence of the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(4); see also id. at § 77-2a-l(l) (requiring conditions to be set 
forth in the plea-in-abeyance agreement); State v. Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59, [^109 21 
P.3d 249 (defining a plea-in-abeyance agreement). By its plain language, the statute 
requires an agreement to "include a full, detailed recitation" of the conditions, and it 
requires the agreement to be in writing if the plea is for a felony. 
Also, Rule 11 governs plea agreements. It states that a court may not accept a plea 
in a case until it has made findings as to "what agreement has been reached." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(e)(6) (2010); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(l)(a). To that end, "[t]he 
trial judge should [still] review the statements in the affidavit with the defendant, ques-
9 
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tion the defendant concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements 
imposed by Frule 111 on the record" before accepting the plea. State v. Lehi, 2003 UT 
App 212, TflO, 73 P.3d 985 (alterations in original; citation omitted); see also Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(e) (the trial court's findings for the plea agreement "may be based on 
questioning of the defendant on the record" or a "written statement" where the court has 
established that the defendant read, understood, and acknowledged the statement). 
Likewise, case law requires the terms of a plea agreement to be explicit and 
unambiguous. See United States v. Burns, 160 F.3d 82, 83 (1st Cir.1998) ("significant 
plea-agreement terms should be stated explicitly and unambiguously so as to preclude 
their subsequent circumvention by either party"); see also State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 
117, Tfl9, 69 P.3d 838 ('"[a]ny omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified 
during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course of the plea 
colloquy'" (citation omitted)). A trial court must ensure that an agreement is clear to all 
parties and it must ensure that defendant has a full understanding of the terms and 
conditions of the plea. See, e.g. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ^ 22, 26 P.3d 203 (the 
purpose of Rule 11 is to ensure that the defendant's plea is knowing and voluntary and he 
is aware of the consequences of a plea); see also State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 
(Utah 1987) ("Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that 
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is 
entered"). 
(2) Ambiguous Terms in a Plea Agreement Are Construed in Favor of the 
Defendant. "Many courts, including the Utah Supreme Court and the United States 
m 
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Supreme Court, have referred to plea agreements as contracts/' but principles in contract 
law "' cannot be blindly incorporated into the criminal law in the area of plea 
bargaining.'" State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 386-387 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting 
United States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. 
Oiesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541, 542 (8th Cir.1990) ("[p]lea agreements are like contracts; 
however, they are not contracts, and therefore contract doctrines do not always apply to 
them;" also "[t]his court has . . . acknowledged the inherent limits of the contract 
analogy") (emphasis in original)). 
"For example, in interpreting plea agreements or determining their validity, courts 
may in certain circumstances hold the government to a higher standard than the 
defendant." Patience, 944 P.2d at 387 (citing United States v. Ringling, 988 F.2d 504, 
506 (4th Cir. 1993) ('"[B]oth constitutional and supervisory concerns require holding the 
government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant... for imprecisions or 
ambiguities in plea agreements'") (quoting United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 
(4th Cir. 1986))). Specifically, a court may construe ambiguities against the government 
and in favor of the defendant. See, e.g.. United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 
(11th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 
2002); In re Altro, 180 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1999). That is because, unlike ordinary 
contracts, the government enjoys significant bargaining power and the plea agreement 
calls for a defendant to waive fundamental constitutional rights. See, e.g. Altro, 180 F.3d 
at 375; Jefferies, 908 F.2d at 1523. 
11 
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(3) A Trial Court May Revoke an Agreement if the Defendant Has Failed to 
Substantially Comply with the Terms. Utah statutory law states the following, 
If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement information 
comes to the attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that the defendant 
has violated any condition of the agreement, the court, at the request of the 
prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion and affidavit, or upon its own 
motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear before the court at a 
designated time and place to show cause why the court should not find the terms 
of the agreement to have been violated and why the agreement should not be 
terminated. If, following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the defendant 
has failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of the plea in 
abeyance agreement, it may terminate the agreement and enter judgment of 
conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for the offense to which the 
original plea was entered. Upon entry of judgment of conviction and imposition 
of sentence, any amounts paid by the defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior to 
termination of the agreement shall be credited against any fine imposed by the 
court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l); Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59, f 14 (agreeing that a "plea in 
abeyance differs from probation in both its statutory provisions and function. Thus, cases 
decided under the probation statutes are not directly applicable to pleas in abeyance"). 
In construing § 77-2a-4, this Court begins with the plain language. See Turnbow, 
2001 UT App 59, Tfl6. The plain language of the statute allows the trial court to 
terminate a plea-in-abeyance agreement if the court finds that the defendant "failed to 
substantially comply" with the terms or conditions. The phrase "substantially comply" or 
"substantial performance" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary for plain-language 
construction. Under the substantial-compliance doctrine, if a party's "good-faith 
attempt to perform does not precisely meet the terms of an agreement or statutory 
requirements," but the essential purpose is accomplished, performance is considered to be 
complete. Black's Law Dictionary, 1566 (9th ed. 2009). That is, under substantial 
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compliance, a party accomplishes the essential purpose of the agreement with a good 
faith attempt, even if the party does not specifically meet the terms of the agreement. In 
addition, under the doctrine, the party is "subject to a claim for damages" for any 
shortfall. IcL; see also State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Utah 1991) (early cases 
required the trial court to comply substantially with the law when taking a guilty plea; 
under that standard, the supreme court may uphold a plea where the trial judge "made no 
inquiry into the elements of the offense charged and their relationship to the facts", but it 
may not uphold a plea which results in a "significant departure from Rule 11" and 
"considerable doubt as to whether a defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary"). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT MARTIN VIOLATED THE 
AGREEMENT BY ASSISTING THE LICENSED THIRD PARTY WITH THE 
WORK. YET THE PLEA AGREEMENT DID NOT PROHIBIT MARTIN 
FROM ASSISTING. 
In this case, Martin and the State entered into a plea agreement on September 29, 
2005, wherein Martin entered into a no-contest plea for criminal mischief (a third degree 
felony), and he agreed to replace a chain-link fence and foliage that were removed from 
Ms. Randazzo's yard. R.55. Also, the agreement required Martin "to have the work 
done by a licensed third party." Id. In addition, Martin was under a "no contact" order; 
he was prohibited from trespassing on Ms. Randazzo's property. R.9. 
On July 28, 2006, the state filed an order to show cause alleging violations of the 
agreement. R. 108-110. On January 19, 2007, the trial court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing on the matter. R.197. At the conclusion of the evidence and over the objections 
of defense counsel, R. 197:56-59, the trial court ruled that Martin had violated the 
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agreement when he assisted the third party with the work. The judge stated: 
I think [Mr. Martin has] frankly acknowledged, at least in my mind, the work was 
not done as ordered by a third-party. 
At least what I've heard - and I'll let you address it if you want. One, I don't hear 
anything to suggest he's violated the no contact order. Two, the shrubbery, no real 
basis for finding that. Three, the tree, frankly, the order is ambiguous. If it wasn't 
ambiguous, you wouldn't be offering that sapling as a replacement, that's -
certainly doesn't violate the letter; you've absolutely violated the spirit of the 
agreement. And last, though, is the third-party agreement, that it be done by a 
licensed third party. You know, one of the reasons was - that is, so we wouldn't 
have this exact kind of issue. The fact is, color it however you want, he was out 
there with a third-party doing the work, and not supervised by the third-party at all 
times. 
R. 197:55-56 (emphasis added); see also id. at 197:57 (stating the order required that "all 
work be[] done by a third-party, and you tell me he's just assisting, and somebody is 
looking over his shoulder. It's not being done by him. And, frankly, he's admitting that 
he wasn't supervised at all times by the third-party"); id. at 197:59 ("My ruling as to the 
plea in abeyance goes solely to not having all work done by a licensed third-party"). The 
trial court's ruling is attached as Addendum C. 
In this case, Martin does not dispute that the evidence presented at the show-cause 
hearing supports that he was "out there with a third-party doing the work," he "wasn't 
supervised at all times by the third-party," R.197:56, 57, and he did not have all work 
done solely by the licensed third party. R.197:59. Indeed, the evidence supports that 
Martin worked with a licensed third party, Evan Lee, to replace and reinforce the fence. 
See R.197:47, 48; Defendant's Exhibits 5 & 7. Martin acknowledged that Lee and he did 
the work together; Martin assisted when needed; and he was able to assist without 
trespassing on Ms. Randazzo's property. R.197:47-50, 52-53; see also R.197:32-34, 36 
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(Stacey Poppleton saw Martin working on the corner end post fitting an end cap). He 
acknowledged that Lee was not present at all times throughout installation of the fence, 
but Lee did most of the work and he was there "[t]he majority of the time." R. 197:50, 55. 
Martin poured the concrete to secure the posts and design of the fence. R. 197:50-51. 
Also, Martin presented evidence relating to the vines on Ms. Randazzo's property 
(see R. 197:45-46; Defendant's Exhibit 3); and he testified that he purchased a tree as a 
replacement for the elm, but did not know what to do with it. R. 197:53-54. He contacted 
his attorney for advice and tried communicating with the assistant district attorney but 
received no information. Id Martin testified that the tree was still available. R. 197:54. 
Martin's testimony is attached as Addendum D. 
Based on the evidence here, Martin complied with the terms of the plea-in-
abeyance agreement. Where the trial court ruled that Martin violated the agreement, that 
ruling was in error and an abuse of discretion for several reasons. 
First, under the plain language of § 77-2a-2(4), the trial court was required to 
include "a full, detailed recitation" of the conditions enforceable against defendant in the 
agreement, and the agreement was required to be in writing. Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-
2(4); Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l(l) (specific conditions must be set forth in the agree-
ment); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6) (a trial court may not accept a plea until it has made 
findings as to "what agreement has been reached"); Burns, 160 F.3d at 83 (significant 
terms of the agreement should be stated explicitly and unambiguously "so as to preclude 
their subsequent circumvention by either party"); Mora, 2003 UT App 117, [^19 ("'[a]ny 
omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing, as 
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must any uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy'") (citation omitted). 
If the trial court had intended to prevent Martin from assisting the third party in 
the work, the trial court was required to include that condition expressly in the agreement. 
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-2(4), 77-2a-l(l); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6); Burns, 
160 F.3d at 83; Mora, 2003 UT App 117, Tf 19. As it stands, the written agreement did 
not prohibit Martin from assisting with or doing some work; it did not require that the 
work be done exclusively or solely by a third party; and it did not mandate that a third 
party supervise Martin at all times. R.55 (requiring Martin to "replace the chain link 
fence and replant an elm tree that defendant removed[,] and replace the shrubs destroyed 
and to have the work done by a licensed third party"). In short, a "full, detailed recitation 
of the requirements" (Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(4)) did not include the restrictions 
identified at the show-cause hearing by the trial court. Compare R.55, and R. 197:55-57. 
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that Martin violated a provision 
not specified in the agreement. See Petersen, 810 P.2d at 425 ("[Tjrial courts do not have 
discretion to misapply the law"). 
Second, the trial court's post-hoc interpretation of the agreement - to preclude 
Martin from assisting the third-party contractor and from doing the work - was improper. 
Under the law of plea agreements, where terms are ambiguous, a court will construe them 
against the government. See, e.g., In re Altro, 180 F.3d at 375; Jefferies, 908 F.2d at 
1523; see also Bickley, 2002 UT App 342,1fi[l2-l3 (the trial court failed to firmly 
establish defendant's responsibilities at the time of the agreement, resulting in error); see 
also Mora, 2003 UT App 117,1J19 ("'[a]ny omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course of the 
plea colloquy'" (cite omitted)). That is because unlike ordinary contracts, a plea 
agreement calls for a defendant to waive fundamental constitutional rights. See In re 
Altro, 180 F.3d at 375; Jefferies, 908 F.2d at 1523. 
Here, the trial court interpreted the language in the agreement - requiring Martin 
to "replace the chain link fence" and "have the work done by a licensed third party," R.55 
- to require the work to be done exclusively and solely by a licensed third party without 
assistance from Martin. R. 197:55-57. But the agreement was silent on that point. See 
R.55. Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion when it interpreted or imported 
language into the agreement against Martin for a violation here. See R. 197:23, 56-58. 
Third, Martin substantially complied with the terms of the agreement. Where the 
agreement required Martin to "replace the chain link fence and replant an elm tree that 
defendant removed[,] and replace the shrubs destroyed and to have the work done by a 
licensed third party," R.55, the trial court ruled that Martin did not violate the agreement 
on the no-contact order and shrubbery; and it ruled that the agreement for the tree was 
ambiguous. Therefore, the court found no violation there. R. 197:55-56. In addition, the 
evidence shows that Martin made bona fide efforts to satisfy the final term of the 
agreement by replacing the chain-link fence. 
Specifically, Martin replaced and reinforced the fence, R.55, 197:45; and while he 
was not supervised in the work at all times, he assisted with building the fence and the 
work was "done by a licensed third party." R.55; 197:48-49; R. 197:55-57 (ruling that 
Martin was "out there with a third-party doing the work," he was assisting and he "wasn't 
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supervised at all times by the third-party"). Martin and the third-party contractor worked 
together at times. R. 197:49. The third party "did most of the work on, as far as tying off 
of the fence, and installing the electrical rod, which is required for grounding of a chain-
link fence." R. 197:50. The third party was there "[t]he majority of the time" for the 
work, R. 197:50; and Martin was present: he "offered assistance when needed" and 
poured concrete. R.197:49-51, 55. 
The record shows Martin's good faith attempt to comply and it shows that Martin 
accomplished the essential purpose of the agreement by building the fence. The record 
supports substantial compliance. Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l) (requiring substantial 
compliance); Black's Law Dictionary, 1566 (defining substantial performance or 
compliance). There was no "significant departure" which would lead to "considerable 
doubt" (Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1125 (discussing substantial compliance in the context of a plea 
agreement)) about whether Martin "replace[d] the chain link fence" and "ha[d] the work 
done by a licensed third party." R.55, 60. In this case, the trial court failed to acknow-
ledge the substantial-compliance standard set forth in the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 
77-2a-4; see also R. 197:55-57 (making no mention of the statute). Where the record 
supports that standard, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to apply it. See 
Petersen, 810 P.2d at 425 ("[T]rial courts do not have discretion to misapply the law"). 
CONCLUSION 
To the extent the agreement may be construed as represented by the trial judge at 
the show-cause hearing, that construction was not explained to Martin when he entered 
into the agreement, and it cannot apply to him at this juncture. Also, that construction 
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was ambiguous. Moreover, Martin substantially complied with the terms of the 
agreement. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that Martin 
violated the agreement. Martin respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court 
ruling and reinstate the agreement since Martin was not in violation of its terms and 
conditions. 
SUBMITTED this 7 ^ day of April, 2011. 
M? % 
Linda M. Jones 
SALT LAKE LEGftL DEFENDER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
MICHAEL C MARTIN, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
NOTICE 
Case No: 041907590 FS 
Judge: DENO *HIMONAS 
Date: August 28, 2009 
PRESENT 
Clerk: krisu 
Prosecutor: BURMESTER, BYRON F 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): FUELLING, BRENNON L 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 28, 1963 
Audio 
Tape Number: S44 Tape Count: 2:15 
CHARGES 
2. CRIMINAL/MISCHIEF - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 03/09/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF a Class A 
Misdemeanor^ the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s) . 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 2 Fine: $2500,00 
>Suspended: $2500.00 
Total Fine: $2500.00 
Total Suspended: $2500.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Prihcipal Due: $0 
t Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 12 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by THIRD DISTRICT COURT. 
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r 
Case No: 041907590 
Date: Aug 28, 2009 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Violate no laws. 
Pay full & complete restitution. 
Complete 25' hours of community service with proof to the court 
within 6 months. 
RESTITUTION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 11/06/2009 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State __ 
SLG# UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
Date; f/&td# 4&r+ DENO HIMONAS 
District Court 
Individuals needing special accommodations (including ,_ 
communicative aids and services) should call Third District 
Court-Salt Lake at (801)238-7500 three days prior to the hearing, 
For TTY service call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128. The general 
information; phone number is (801)238-7300, 
:-. I \<XAXL 
$&Ma l 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY, 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON RUE IN 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COI 
OF UTAH, 
DATE: 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL C MARTIN, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
MANNING HEARING/ORDER 
Case No: 041907590 FS 
Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
Date: December 17, 2010 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kristenl 
Prosecutor: BURMESTER, BYRON F 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SIMMS, CLAYTON A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 28, 1963 
Audio 
Tape Number: S44 Tape Count: 2:51-3:13 
CHARGES 
2. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea:" No Contest - Disposition: 03/09/2007 Guilty 
HEARING 
Start times: .2:28, 2:41 and 2:51, 
COUNT: 2:52 
Defendant is sworn and testifies on his own behalf. 
COUNT: 3:05 
Cross examination. 
COUNT: 3:05 
Re-direct> 
COUNT: 3:06 
Argument, Court denies the motion to strike. Court is 
reinstating the time for appeal. Defendant.,has 30 d^ys from today 
to file appeal. 
Date: /&, Vnh/<" 
Dfl&D'HlMONi 
D i s t r i c t 
I CERTIFY THATTHIS IS ATRUF COPY OF AH 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE JHIR0 
DISTRICT COURT.SAU LAKE COUNTY. STAT-
OFUTAH, ZZ^p^g^iC-t 
Page 1 ( las t ) 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2a-l 
§ 77-2a-l. Definitions 
For the purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that 
time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on 
condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance 
agreement. 
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the 
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, 
following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2a-2 
§ 77-2a-2. Plea in abeyance agreement—Negotiation—Contents—Terms of 
agreement—Waiver of time for sentencing 
(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest but prior to entry of 
judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, the court may, upon motion of both 
the prosecuting attorney and the defendant, hold the plea in abeyance and not enter 
judgment of conviction against the defendant nor impose sentence upon the defendant 
within the time periods contained in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(2) The defendant shall be represented by counsel during negotiations for a plea in 
abeyance and at the time of acknowledgment and affirmation of any plea in abeyance 
agreement unless the defendant shall have knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 
counsel. 
(3) The defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at any court hearing relating 
to a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(4)(a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the prosecution and the 
defendant and approved by the court shall include a full, detailed recitation of the 
requirements and conditions agreed to by the defendant and the reason for requesting the 
court to hold the plea in abeyance. 
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any combination of misdemeanors and felonies, the 
agreement shall be in writing and shall, prior to acceptance by the court, be executed by 
the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's counsel in the presence of 
the court. 
(5) A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than 18 months if the plea 
was to any class of misdemeanor or longer than three years if the plea was to any degree 
of felony or to any combination of misdemeanors and felonies. 
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(6) A plea in abeyance agreement shall not be approved unless the defendant, before the 
court, and any written agreement, knowingly and intelligently waives time for sentencing 
as designated in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2a-3 
§ 77-2a-3. Manner of entry of plea-Powers of court 
(l)(a) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a plea in abeyance agreement shall be 
done in full compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
(b) In cases charging offenses for which bail may be forfeited, a plea in abeyance 
agreement may be entered into without a personal appearance before a magistrate. 
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that the court may, upon finding that the 
defendant has successfully completed the terms of the agreement: 
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter judgment of conviction and impose 
sentence for a lower degree of offense; or 
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant's plea and order the dismissal of the case. 
(3) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully completed the terms of a plea in 
abeyance agreement, the court may reduce the degree of the offense or dismiss the case 
only as provided in the plea in abeyance agreement or as agreed to by all parties. Upon 
sentencing a defendant for any lesser offense pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement, 
the court may not invoke Section 76-3-402 to further reduce the degree of the offense. 
(4) The court may require the Department of Corrections to assist in the administration of 
the plea in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were on probation to the court under 
Section 77-18-1. 
(5) The terms of a plea in abeyance agreement may include: 
(a) an order that the defendant pay a nonrefundable plea in abeyance fee, with a 
surcharge based on the amount of the plea in abeyance fee, both of which shall be 
allocated in the same manner as if paid as a fine for a criminal conviction under Section 
78A-5-110 and a surcharge under Title 51, Chapter 9, Part 4, Criminal Conviction 
Surcharge Allocation, and which may not exceed in amount the maximum fine and Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Cl rk Law School, BYU. 
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surcharge which could have been imposed upon conviction and sentencing for the same 
offense; 
(b) an order that the defendant pay restitution to the victims of the defendant's actions 
as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; 
(c) an order that the defendant pay the costs of any remedial or rehabilitative program 
required by the terms of the agreement; and 
(d) an order that the defendant comply with any other conditions which could have 
been imposed as conditions of probation upon conviction and sentencing for the same 
offense. 
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without the consent of both the prosecuting 
attorney and the defendant. A decision by a prosecuting attorney not to agree to a plea in 
abeyance is final. 
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a sexual offense against a 
victim who is under the age of 14. 
(8) Beginning on July 1, 2008, no plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a 
driving under the influence violation under Section 41-6a-502. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2a-4 
§ 77-2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance agreement—Hearing—Entry of judgment 
and imposition of sentence—Subsequent prosecutions 
(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement, information comes to the 
attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that the defendant has violated any condition of 
the agreement, the court, at the request of the prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion 
and affidavit, or upon its own motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear 
before the court at a designated time and place to show cause why the court should not find the 
terms of the agreement to have been violated and why the agreement should not be terminated. 
If, following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the defendant has failed to substantially 
comply with any term or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may terminate the 
agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for the 
offense to which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of judgment of conviction and 
imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior to 
termination of the agreement shall be credited against any fine imposed by the court. 
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent entry of judgment of 
conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any independent prosecution arising from 
any offense that constituted a violation of any term or condition of an agreement whereby the 
original plea was placed in abeyance. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs 
MICHAEL M. MARTIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
20070426-CA 
Case No. 041907590 FS 
Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
THE ABOVE captioned matter came before the 
Honorable Deno G. Himonas, on January 19, 2007, at the 
Matheson Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
For the State 
For the Defendant: 
FRED BURMESTER 
TOM LOPRESTO 
Deputy DAf s 
KEVIN KURUMADA 
Attorney at Law 
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1 Siberian elm. 
2 Q. Do you know what kind of tree it is? 
3 A. I believe it's a maple tree. 
4 Q. Okay. 
5 MR. KURUMADA: Thank you. 
6 That's all I have. 
7 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
8 BY MR. BURMESTER: 
9 Q. Who replaced the fence? 
10 A. Mr. Lee. 
11 Q. All right. But you were there? 
12 A. Yes, I was there present and he did the 
13 tying off of the fence. 
14 Q. When? 
15 A. When? Exact — in the course of this — 
16 THE COURT: I've heard enough, 
17 Mr. Burmester. 
18 MR. BURMESTER: You don't want anymore 
19 examination? 
20 THE COURT: (Inaudible) . 
21 MR. BURMESTER: Okay. 
22 THE COURT: I don't think so, I mean — 
23 MR. KURUMADA: That's fine. 
24 THE COURT: — Mr. Kurumada, I think he's 
25 frankly acknowledged, at least in my mind, the work 
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1 was not done as ordered by a third-party. 
2 At least what I!ve heard — and IT11 let 
3 you address it if you want. One, I donft hear 
4 anything to suggest he's violated the no contact 
5 order. Two, the shrubbery, no real basis for finding 
6 that. Three, the tree, frankly, the order is 
7 ambiguous. If it wasn't ambiguous, you wouldn't be 
8 offering that sapling as a replacement, that's — 
9 certainly doesn't violate the letter/ you' ve 
10 absolutely violated the spirit of the agreement. And 
11 last, though, is the third-party agreement, that it be 
12 done by a licensed third-party. You know, one of the 
13 reasons was — that is, so we wouldn't have this exact 
14 kind of issue. The fact is, color it however you 
15 want, he was out there with a third-party doing the 
16 work, and not supervised by the third-party at all 
17 times. 
18 MR. KURUMADA: The only argument I'd 
19 offer, Your Honor, is: The work is supposed to be 
20 done by a third-party, but it's not — 
21 THE COURT: All work. 
22 MR. KURUMADA: It's not — it doesn't 
23 prohibit him from assisting a third party. And that's 
24 what he's doing, he's trying to assist labor to cover 
25 the costs. 
I ,—__
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1 THE COURT: You can sit down. 
2 MR. KURUMADA: That's — 
3 THE COURT: Well, then all work isn * t 
4 being done by a third-party. I mean, the order is all 
5 work being done by a third-party, and you tell me he's 
6 just assisting, and somebody is looking over his 
7 shoulder. It's not being done by him. And, frankly, 
8 he's admitted that he wasn't supervised at all times 
9 by the third-party. 
10 You can step down, Mr. Martin. 
11 THE WITNESS: All right. 
12 MR. KURUMADA: We'd rest. 
13 MR. BURMESTER: We'd submit it, 
14 Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: All right. I'm revoking the 
16 plea in abeyance. 
17 MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, we would ask 
18 that we do a PSR, and that way we can determine a 
19 value of the restitution, and then we can just talk 
20 about money instead of different people putting things 
21 in question. 
22 THE COURT: I'll make it clear for the 
23 record: There are four allegations, I believe, in the 
24 affidavit. 
25 MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, I think the 
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1 one is just an assertion that the Court made some 
2 orders, so it would really be three allegations of 
3 violation: Two, 3 and 4. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Kurumada, if you think If m 
5 wrong, this is your chance to argue, but Ifm letting 
6 you know what IT m thinking. 
7 Let me put it differently: I know you 
8 think I'm wrong, this is still your chance to convince 
9 me, but that's --
10 MR. KURUMADA: Well, all I would say, 
11 Judge, is that I think Mr. Martin did the best he 
12 could in terms of respecting the Court's order. He 
13 did have someone who did the majority of the work with 
14 respect to the fence. It wasn't as — it wasn't maybe 
15 as good as Ms. Randazzo wanted, but she also wanted 
16 and eight-foot vinyl fence, too, and that was totally 
17 not in the spirit of the plea negotiation or the plea 
18 in abeyance. 
19 THE COURT: Clearly not. 
20 MR. KURUMADA: And, you know, he was 
21 supposed furnish a tree. You are not going to be able 
22 to go out and find a 50-foot elm tree. 
23 THE COURT: You can find replacement 
24 trees. Itfs expensive, but thatfs what happens when 
25 you chop down mature trees. 
I _
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1 Now, I understand that we didnft talk 
2 about it, and I donft know if I would have ordered, 
3 you know, a 50-foot elm tree or — what I do know, it 
4 wouldnft have been a sapling. It wouldn't have been 
5 something that has about a — you know, two-inch 
6 diameter either. 
7 MR. KURUMADA: Uh-huh. 
8 THE COURT: Be that as it may, I'm not 
9 revoking on that because of the ambiguity. 
10 MR. KURUMADA: That's fine --
11 THE COURT: I'm just indicating for 
12 purposes of my ruling, I do believe it's ambiguous. I 
13 do believe that Mr. Martin at least violated the 
14 spirit of that, but because of its ambiguity, in no 
15 way, shape or — no way, shape or form — in ruling 
16 that he violated the plea in abeyance as a result. 
17 My ruling as to the plea in abeyance goes 
18 solely to not having all work done by a licensed 
19 third-party, period. 
20 MR. KURUMADA: Okay. I understand. 
21 THE COURT: That's the sole basis. 
22 MR. KURUMADA: Do you want to set — do 
23 you want a PSR? 
24 THE COURT: Do I need a Presentence Report 
25 for this? 
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BY MR. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
MR. KURUMADA: No objection. 
THE COURT: I'll receive it. 
Thank you very much. 1 
(State's Exhibit No. 10 Marked and 
Admitted.) 
THE COURT: Anybody else? 
MR. LOPRESTO: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Kurumada. 
MR. KURUMADA: We'll call Mr. Martin. 
MICHAEL MARTIN, 
called as a witness on his own behalf, 
having been duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Kurumada. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
KURUMADA: 
State your name for the record, please? 
Michael Martin. 
You are the neighbor of Ms. Randazzo, is 
that correct? 
as 
A. 
Q. 
well 
A. 
That's correct. 
And you've been in a long dispute, civil 
as criminal, with Ms. Randazzo? 
No, that's not — as far as — did you say 
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criminal, too. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes? 
Yes. 
Okay. You went to court, at one point, to 
try to establish a property line, is that right? 
A. 
Q. 
because — 
get this -• 
Correct. 
Okay. Why did you remove this fence? 
THE COURT: Does it matter? 
MR. KURUMADA: I think so, Judge, 
You did remove the fence? 
THE COURT: Doesn't matter. 
MR. KURUMADA: Okay. 
Let me ask you: Where — where did you 
- oh, I should have this marked as 5. 
(Discussion off the Record.) 
MR. KURUMADA: Six. 
THE COURT: Mr. Kurumada, I understand 
from my experience with the case, Mr. Martin, if I 
recall correctly, believed he had a right to remove 
the fence. 
mean, he's 
motivation 
contesting 
That's not where we are now, right? I 
acknowledged liability, so why would his 
make any difference at this point? 
MR. KURUMADA: Well, Your Honor, he is 
the fact that he did replace the fence, it 
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was done properly. 
THE COURT: I understand that, but why 
does it matter why he originally tore down the fence? 
MR. KURUMADA: Okay, I agree with you 
there. 
Did you replace the fence? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Twice? 
A. No. There was only one time it was 
replaced and then it was reinforced to what was 
necessary per her complaint. 
Q. Let me show you Exhibit 3 and ask you: Do 
you recognize that photograph? 
A. I do. 
MR. KURUMADA: You've seen that haven't 
you, Fred? 
MR. BURMESTER: Which number? 
THE COURT: Defendant's Exhibit 3. 
MR. BURMESTER: Okay. 
MR. KURUMADA: Okay. When did you take 
that photograph? 
A. This winter, this year. 
Q. All right. Do you know approximately 
when? 
A. Within the last 30 to 60 days. 
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Q. All right. 
Now, the vines that Ms. Randazzo says you 
took out, are they reflected in this photograph as 
growing back? 
A. Yes, it — the vines are reflected in that 
photograph. 
Q. Now, this is Exhibit 4. When was that 
taken? 
A. That was taken about the time we had civil 
issues of that tree being destructive to private 
property. 
Q. Now, let me direct your attention to the 
middle of this photograph: That fence is different 
from this fence in Exhibit 3, is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Is that because the old fence has been 
replaced by the new fence? 
A. This is an older fence on different 
property. Actually, that's a different property, and 
that fence has been taken down since — during this 
dispute. I don't know the exact date. I probably 
could find it. 
Q. Okay — 
THE COURT: Offer 3 and 4? 
MR. KURUMADA: Yes. 
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1 THE COURT: Any objection? 
2 MR. LOPRESTO: No, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: If11 receive them. 
4 MR. KURUMADA: Thank you. 
5 (Defendants Exhibit Nos. 3 & 4 Marked 
6 and Admitted.) 
7 MR. KURUMADA: Mr. Martin, who assisted 
8 you in the construction of the fence? 
9 A. Mr. Evan Lee. 
10 Q. And how do you know Mr. Evan Lee? 
11 A. He!s personally worked on the property for 
12 20 years. 
13 Q. Do you know what his profession is? 
14 A. Electrician slash handyman. 
15 Q. And when you say "slash handyman", what 
16 does that mean? 
17 A. Hefs been involved in all sorts of 
18 handyman-type activities. He!s done more than just 
19 electrician work on the property. He!s helped with 
20 cleanup and different things like that. 
21 Q. Let me hand you that other exhibit, 
22 (Inaudible) , very short letter — oh, never mind. 
23 (Defendant's Exhibit No. 5 Marked.) 
24 MR. KURUMADA: Let me show you (Handing) 
25 what!s been marked Exhibit 5. 
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What is that? 
A. A letter signed by Mr. Lee stating that I 
invited him to assist in the installation of the 
fence, and he did so. 
Q. Okay — 
(Discussion off the Record.) 
MR. KURUMADA: With respect to Mr. Lee, 
how did you find him? 
A. Personal acquaintance. 
Q. Okay. Has he done work for you in the 
past? 
A. Yes, he has. 
Q. Is that his website or a website that 
indicates that that's what he does? 
A. Yes, that's his State sites indicating 
that he's a licensed electrician. 
Q. And he assisted you in the construction of 
the fence? 
A. Yes. 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 7 Marked.) 
MR. KURUMADA: I'd offer 5 and 6 --
actually, this is marked 7. 
I'll offer 5 and 7. 
Do you have any objection? 
MR. BURMESTER: Not on the website thing. 
: :
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MR. KURUMADA: That just establishes 
his --
MR. BURMESTER: The latter, if I may just 
wait until I can do cross-examination? 
THE COURT: You want to voir dire in aid 
of an objection, go ahead. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BURMESTER: 
Q. I'm referring to State's Exhibit — 
looking — I have it, sorry — Defendant's Exhibit 5. 
Will you take a look at that? 
Lee says in that letter that he helped 
you, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Install a fence? 
A. I asked him to assist, yes. 
Q. Okay. And you helped him and he helped 
you put the fence in the ground — 
A. Yes. 
Q. — together? 
A. I provided materials and he assisted in 
finishing up the fence. 
Q. Okay. Did you put it in the ground with 
the assistance of Mr. Lee? 
A. With his assistance — he needed 
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assistance, and I offered assistance when needed. 
" '" kay Yi)"i;' w-:i'n then • '" 
Il wi-i..i there any time that he I he 
d i d mus t ul I I HI Willi II-' 1 mi in nil1; lai, i i ; lyi. in.) uf f I. I In 
f e n c e , and i n s t a l l i n g t h e e l e c t r i c a l , r o d , which i s 
teqi/i i m d l"m «i r ouikil I I n\ I n I M I I I- I o n c e l m I I m -
™ which roquires an electrician I" o be involved, su lie::1 
a ;n. s i fitful in II II II in i I ' 1" h J IIUC'I I u u , 
He a l s o p r o v i d e d t h e f e n c e a n d t h e 
i ' - : meshincj, f j o m o t h 11n || i, 11 11 II i i;.; • 
i n v e n t o r y . 
THE COT JRT • 
i n s t a l l a t i o n ? 
THE WITNESS: Nn Tl n IT a - j o r i t y nf IMI ••• 
tii lie he was t h e r e II, a s s i s t e d w i t h s e t t i n g t h e p o s t , 
which n e e d e d some expei *• a r s i *::li.a,»^ I'-e, ,bec,::iriG'n I i mr, 
t a k i n g a c l a s s in c o n s t r u c t i o n - c o n c r e t e -• c o n c r e t e 
t h e o z j And n e e d e d h i ho IVM nfcn i V-M I n I iial i I wi m I d 
be s t r o n g enoucr^ +"o h o l d u n a f e n c e J f t h e r e was any 
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n e e d e d some a s s i s t a n t - -. development ol" t h e f e n c e 
JURMESTEP ^ u dxg t h e holo.1, 
^r^o T*ra e T\r\ 
^ . ~ - ^ j ^ t h e f e n c e : n t o "the c o n c r e t e 
A T r^nnr
 i to c o n c r e t e i n t o t h e p o s t 
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secure the design of the engineering that I felt was 
necessary to help secure those posts. 
Q. And this State1s Exhibit 7, does it — 
THE COURT: Defendant's Exhibit 7. 
MR. BURMESTER: Defendant's Exhibit 7. 
Does it state who hefs licensed with and for what 
profession? 
A. It says that he's licensed with the State 
of Utah as a Master Electrician. 
Q. Does it say anything about fence 
installation? 
A. Fence installation, no, it does not. 
MR. BURMESTER: Okay. No objection, Your 
Honor, 
THE COURT: I'll receive it. 
(Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 5 and 7 
Admitted.) 
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DIRECT EXAMINATION (resumed) 
BY" MR., KURUMM3A: 
„), Wo „ when 'you Install a metal fence, you' v e 
g o t t o fvi v: j -i •< • "I ect:.i ,.i ,: i a11 i g i, ,11 I J I 
'"•' A c c o r d i n g t o t h e mttanufacturer f s w a r r a n t y ,„ 
L£ you were t o i n f\ I:.HI 1 1 HI i.vil "< arm v.orl t.'encc! you h«five I o 
f o l l o w "'"'" '"'J', t a i n w a r r a n t y r u l e s which r e q u i r e an 
e l e c t r i c i a n t o ho i \w n I \ H >i1 i im- iko s u r e t h a t , r l i o ^ i i , i: 
. l i ne s a r e n o t a b o v e o r c e r t a i n - s i z e d power l i n e s a r e 
n o t w i t h i n s o many feet" nil" the1 frm i in r a s e .'1110. wv»xe 
to f a J 1 on t h e f e n c e . 
And x i s o m e t h i n u wor h i I  ,-i II II / m i lIHlhi -,» 
fence, that it's properly grounded even 11 £ lighting 
were to strike. 
Q "Ukay, And that's what he did as well 
A. Yes, he came 011 II' liio first ij.i1* n h. bseivi/ 
you know, what was necessary as it pertained to his 
€ixpertise. 
i,} Now, you a m under a court order not to go 
on her property, is that right? 
A. I'lial: '" s correct 
Q. So, you couldn't go on the other side? of 
he 1 property and you — IT. help .install the fence. 
Did you ever do that9 
\ . Il 11 e v e r ciixJ, 
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1 Q. Okay, you stayed on that easement — 
2 concrete easement area? 
3 A. I clearly stayed on private property. 
4 Q. Okay. Now, with respect to the elm tree, 
5 you did purchase an elm tree? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 Q. Now, you were not directed by the order of 
8 the court to replace a 40-foot elm tree, were you? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. You were just told to furnish another elm 
11 tree that could be planted? 
12 A. Correct. 
13 Q. And several times you inquired of me as to 
14 whether you should deliver that tree and I said, "No," 
15 is that correct? 
16 A. That's correct. 
17 Q. Because of the outstanding order? 
18 A. Correct. 
19 Q. Did you ever attempt — you were told not 
20 to contact her either, correct? 
21 A. That's correct. 
22 Q. Ms. Randazzo. 
23 Did you make any effort through another 
24 party to indicate to her that you had purchased an elm 
25 tree, and you were trying to get it to her, but you 
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were afraid to qo on luri" property? 
' Y i " < i" ' 'nccited I "i, n , iiiii i,l 1 b e l i e v e 
we tried to communicate with the District Attorney to 
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^ -
?
 • .i • it was Clark Harms? 
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,,) R i g h t . And t h a t i MIS, l he County Air to i 
y a s g o i n g t o do t h a t a t: 1,1" i a I t ime ? 
i\. Tl ia L" s c o r r e c t . 
Q Did you e v e r r e c e i v e any i n f o r m a t i o n from 
rue or the? Coun ty A t t o r n e y that, Ms N.-mdci zz,n hr.nl I u >< 
c o n t a c t e d by Harms, t h e P r o s e c u t o r , a n d t o .Id t;n 'i 
p i c k up t h e t r e e , o r q.ivo vou :i;i m octi our HI 1' i i H l l i a t I 
do wi LIn i t , o r g i v e hum d i r e c t i o n s t o g i v e t o yo 
A, Nri I h a v e l o c e i v e d no communxcatJ nor 
!;., t ;i e 111 H II., L».." i . i:.. 1.1 > a d v a n c e i. 1. 
Q Okay Is; LLat tree s t i l l available ? 
A . in i in I in i . 
Q. And i t T s t h e same k i n d of t r e e ? 
A. in lit." Liu vo i I " u rj b e t t e r t r e e t h a n a 
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1 Siberian elm. 
2 Q. Do you know what kind of tree it is? 
3 A. I believe it's a maple tree. 
4 Q. Okay. 
5 MR. KURUMADA: Thank you. 
6 That's all I have. 
7 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
8 BY MR. BURMESTER: 
9 Q. Who replaced the fence? 
10 A. Mr. Lee. 
11 Q. All right. But you were there? 
12 A. Yes, I was there present and he did the 
13 tying off of the fence. 
14 Q. When? 
15 A. When? Exact — in the course of this — 
16 THE COURT: I've heard enough, 
17 Mr. Burmester. 
18 MR. BURMESTER: You don't want anymore 
19 examination? 
20 THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
21 MR. BURMESTER: Okay. 
22 THE COURT: I don't think so, I mean — 
23 MR. KURUMADA: That's fine. 
24 THE COURT: — Mr. Kurumada, I think he's 
25 frankly acknowledged, at least in my mind, the work 
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